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he ongoing crisis in Ukraine not only challenges the country’s stability, sovereignty 
and integrity, it is also the culmination of the increasingly open rivalry between the 
European Union and Russia over their ‘common’ neighbourhood. Competition 
between Brussels and Moscow has crystallised in the region around two mutually exclusive 
integration projects, the Eastern Partnership and the Eurasian Customs Union. 
The current crisis involves much more than just the rivalry between two economic 
integration projects, however. It has its roots in two interconnected factors. First, the (mis-) 
perceptions that developed between Russia and the West (the EU, especially NATO and the 
US) after the collapse of the USSR paved the way for confrontation rather than cooperation. 
Second, the crisis stems from actions taken by Russia as a result of these perceptions. In 
other words, Russia has made systematic attempts to destabilise the countries seeking closer 
integration with the EU and NATO, and has increasingly used coercion to safeguard its 
influence in the post-Soviet space.  
While the outcome of current events in Ukraine remains uncertain, the escalation of the 
conflict is not only likely to damage the EU-Russia partnership, it will also lead to a ‘lose-
lose’ situation in the region that divides countries between those choosing EU integration 
and those engaging in the Russian-led Eurasian integration project.  
T 
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The EU-Russia ‘common’ neighbourhood has never truly been a ‘shared’ neighbourhood. 
Over the past year, it seems to have already turned into a divided neighbourhood where 
partner countries are compelled to choose between two actors competing for influence. But 
ultimately, the Ukrainian crisis is likely to turn the area into a fragmented neighbourhood; a 
highly unstable and volatile region with changing and overlapping external influences and 
shifting loyalties.  
From suspicion to confrontation in the common neighbourhood: Russian 
and EU (mis)perceptions 
The newly appointed EU foreign affairs chief, Federica Mogherini, indicated recently that 
because of its role in the Ukrainian crisis Russia is no longer a strategic partner for the EU.1  
But has Russia ever been a strategic partner in the common neighbourhood? While the 
confrontation between the EU and Russia came to a head in Ukraine last year, Russia has not 
always acted with intent to thwart the EU’s initiatives in the post-Soviet space and the 
former Eastern bloc. In particular, Russia initially perceived the EU as being decoupled from 
other Western organisations widely viewed as hostile, such as NATO.  
After the collapse of the USSR, while NATO was viewed as an unnecessary legacy of the 
past, the EU came to be seen as a major partner in Russia’s reform process. True, even before 
the EU’s 2004 enlargement was complete Russia pointed out the possible negative 
consequences of EU expansion for its economic interests, and viewed its impact with 
ambivalence.2 However, while Russia fiercely opposed NATO’s enlargement towards its 
borders, it did not resist the expansion of the EU with the same degree of vehemence. 
Instead, in the early 2000s Moscow showed considerable interest in developing a strategic 
partnership with the EU.3 Russia’s interests were not confined to trade and energy. Clearly, 
by that time the EU was also perceived in Moscow as a potential partner to establish an 
effective system of collective security in Europe “on the basis of equality without dividing 
lines”; 4 something that in Russia’s view has failed to happen since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
Nevertheless, the partnership that developed with Brussels in the early 2000s was 
underpinned by false premises5 and misperceptions. From the outset the EU-Russia strategic 
partnership has been fraught with inherent tensions and misperceptions regarding the 
common neighbourhood. From the EU side, it was based on the assumption that Russia was 
a soon-to-be democracy sharing EU values and interests and that it could act as a 
responsible partner in the common neighbourhood. From Russia’s side, it was premised on 
two connected postulates: the weakness of the EU as a security actor and its low profile in 
the post-Soviet space. The creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 
                                                     
1  “Mogherini: Russia is no longer the EU’s strategic partner”, Euractiv, 02 September 2014 
(http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/mogherini-russia-no-longer-eus-strategic-
partner-308152).  
2  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1999), “Russia’s Middle-Term Strategy 
towards the EU (2000-2010)”. 
3  Ibid. and “Joint Statement of the EU-Russia Summit”, Saint-Petersburg, 31 May 2003 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/75969.pdf). 
4  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1999), “Russia’s Middle-Term Strategy 
towards the EU (2000-2010)”. 
5 H. Haukkala (2008), “False Premises, Sound Principles: The Way Forward in EU-Russia relations”, 
FIIA Briefing Paper No. 20. 
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was the first blow to the latter. Russia initially criticised the  ENP for being founded on EU 
norms and conditionality, which the country has clearly rejected in its own relationship with 
the EU. The Rose, and especially the Orange, revolutions set off alarm bells in Russia, 
signalling a loss of influence in the post-Soviet sphere and a corresponding (in Moscow’s 
eyes) Western assertiveness in the region. The ENP thus came to be seen as an intrusion into 
Russia’s ‘near abroad’ – an area that the country was clearly not prepared to discuss with the 
EU under the Roadmap on External Security established in 2005 as part of the strategic 
partnership.  
The Eastern Partnership clearly marked a shift in Russia’s perceptions of the EU. The 
initiative was launched by Poland and Sweden in 2008 in a context of marked deterioration 
in relations between Russia, the US and NATO over the latter’s possible expansion to 
Georgia and Ukraine; the independence of Kosovo; and finally the war in Georgia. Against 
this backdrop, the shift to hard-law integration under the Eastern Partnership has been 
perceived in Moscow as a bold move bearing potential regional integration effects. This is 
because Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) and many sectoral 
chapters of the Association Agreements (AAs), in particular, imply a drastic shift towards 
the EU’s legal framework, and ultimately integration into the EU’s internal market. Clearly, 
the breadth and depth of the integration process foreseen by the Eastern Partnership has 
been a major source of concern to Russia ever since the initiative was launched. For Russia, 
converging with the acquis also means a shift away from what ties these countries have with 
Moscow. The EU thus became increasingly coupled with NATO in Russia’s perception. 
When the Eastern Partnership’s offer materialised, with the negotiation of four AAs and 
DCFTAs, Russia adopted an overtly confrontational position vis-à-vis the EU. 
Russia’s policies in the common neighbourhood: from reluctant observer to 
active saboteur 
In recent years, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus have been 
driven by one overarching goal: retaining influence in the former Soviet Republics. Yet the 
way in which Moscow has sought to achieve this goal has substantially evolved in response 
to the EU’s growing attractiveness. A decade ago, when the EU was still a newcomer in the 
region, Russia did little more than rely on existing ties between post-Soviet countries to 
maintain its stronghold. In contrast to the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia is now 
systematically using these ties coercively, either as a mechanism to block further progress in 
the integration process with the European Union, or as a lever to induce post-Soviet 
countries into the Eurasian integration project. In essence, over the past few months Russia 
has been creating instability in countries of the common neighbourhood with a view to 
(re)gaining long-term control over the region, inter alia through Eurasian integration.  
Russia’s hegemony in the post-Soviet space: embedded in the past 
Arguably, retaining its hold over the former Soviet Republics should be an easy task for 
Moscow. As a result of their shared tsarist and Soviet past, Russia is immensely influential 
in the region. The Russian language is still, and will remain for some time, the lingua franca 
there. Its predominance is further sustained by the widespread dissemination of Russian 
media. Russia is a key trading partner for most, if not all, post-Soviet states. At present, its 
market is broadly accessible to countries that share the legacy of Soviet standards and 
struggle to meet World Trade Organisation (WTO) requirements. Mobility and migration 
are still other instruments of Russian influence. Over the past two decades Russia’s 
neighbourhood has largely remained visa-free and Russia’s labour market is attractive both 
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because of its size and the lack of obstacles to mobility. Remittances from migrants working 
in Russia significantly contribute to their countries’ economies, as is the case in Armenia, 
Moldova and Tajikistan, for instance. Last but not least, Russia has a military presence in a 
number of post-Soviet countries, including in most countries of the common 
neighbourhood.   
In essence, Russia could effectively maintain its hegemony by doing nothing more than rely 
upon its capital of influence. While the bulk of this capital derives from the past, in the 
common neighbourhood path dependence provides Russia with a strong lever compared to 
the EU. Beyond the narrow circle of policy-makers and experts who negotiated the 
association agreements, citizens in partner countries actually know very little of the EU, 
whereas they are wholly familiar with Russia. In contrast to the EU, the lack of the above-
mentioned obstacles to trade and mobility (i.e. different standards, quotas, visas) makes it 
(theoretically) very easy for these countries to export to Russia and to travel there. In other 
words, EU trade and mobility barriers, as well as exacting requirements in the short term are 
only likely to result in boosting Russia’s immediate leverage over its partner countries. 
Nevertheless, Russia has little credibility in the region as a model of development – a feature 
that is also connected to the shortcomings of its own transformation process; this is precisely 
what the EU offers to the common neighbourhood with the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and the Eastern Partnership.6 While these initiatives do not include a membership 
perspective at the moment, they could have a transformative effect and offer guidance and 
support in the reform process. In the region, the EU is thus widely seen as a template for 
modernisation and prosperity, 7  while Russia has little legitimacy in this respect. In 
Moscow’s view, this gap constitutes a threat, since the EU’s growing attractiveness entails 
(from Russia’s perspective) decreasing Russian influence.  
Eurasian integration as a long-term project to (re)gain control over the post-
Soviet space 
This has moved the issue of the post-Soviet region to the very top of Russia’s foreign policy 
agenda and prompted the Kremlin to give a strong impetus to its own integration project, 
namely the Customs Union and the future Eurasian Economic Union. In essence, the 
Customs Union (initiated in 2006 and launched in 2010)8 is a major turning point in Russia’s 
policies in its neighbourhood. Whereas until then Russia conducted pragmatic policies 
driven by short-term motivations and instruments, the future Eurasian Economic Union9 
was conceived as a long-term project meant to cement ties among post-Soviet countries 
                                                     
6 L. Delcour and K. Wolczuk (2013), “Beyond the Vilnius Summit. Challenges for deeper economic 
integration with Eastern Europe”, European Policy Centre, Brussels. 
7 See e.g. the discourse by President Sargsyan at the Eastern Partnership Vilnius summit: ‘Building 
and strengthening Armenian nationhood upon a European model has been the conscious choice of 
ours and that process is hence irreversible. Our major objective is to form such mechanisms with the 
European Union that on the one hand would reflect the deep nature of our social-political and 
economic relationship, and on the other – would be compatible with other formats of co-operation’. 
Speech at the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 29 November 2013 
(http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/11/29/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-
at-the-third-Eastern-Partnership-summit/).   
8 N. Popescu (2014), “Eurasian Union: the Real, the Imaginary and the Likely”, Chaillot Paper No. 132, 
September. 
9 The Treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union was signed on 29 May 2014. The Union will be 
launched in January 2015. 
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through wide-ranging and far-reaching integration. In other words, it is an initiative that 
draws upon post-Soviet legacies and ties, yet embeds them in the present to build a common 
future.10 Undoubtedly, the Customs Union differs in scope, depth and pace from previous 
attempts at regional cooperation in the post-Soviet sphere.11 It aims to create a Eurasian 
Economic Union only five years after the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan was launched and three years after the Common Economic Space between the 
three countries came into force.  
While much remains to be done to consolidate and expand Eurasian integration, the way in 
which Russia has tried to expand the Customs Union is undoubtedly an attempt to thwart 
the EU’s Eastern Partnership. Indeed, the Eurasian Customs Union cannot be combined with 
DCFTAs. In principle, the countries in the EU-Russia common neighbourhood can sign the 
DCFTA with the EU and negotiate and sign another free trade agreement with the Russian-
led Customs Union. However, the Kremlin pressured post-Soviet countries for full 
membership of the Eurasian Customs Union instead of a mere free trade agreement. Yet, full 
membership in the Customs Union and a DCFTA with the EU are mutually exclusive. This 
is primarily because membership of the Customs Union implies a loss of sovereignty of 
member countries over trade policy and sets common tariffs that are incompatible with the 
elimination of tariffs planned under the DCFTA. With the Eurasian integration project 
Russia is de facto compelling countries in the common neighbourhood to choose between 
the two projects.  
Coercion at the core of Russian power  
The Eurasian project adopted the language of the EU integration process, yet differences are 
substantial in terms of institutions, legal bases and policies. An assessment of background, 
formation and process conditions of economic integration reveals that conditions for EU-like 
integration are not favourable in the post-Soviet region.12 However, the main difference 
between the two projects lies in the method of, and approach to, integration. The European 
integration process has been of a voluntary nature and enlargement, in particular, derives 
from the EU’s attractiveness for non-members. In contrast, Russia has extensively used 
coercion to induce new members to join and to deter Eastern partners from progressing 
further towards EU integration. 
Clearly, the Kremlin does not run the Eurasian integration process as a mutually beneficial 
partnership for all member states. While Russia is in principle constrained by multilateral 
arrangements, since it cannot impose any decisions alone, the Customs Union is to a large 
extent asymmetrical. Even though Belarus and Kazakhstan have a say in the Eurasian 
Customs Union’s institutional arrangements, they have de facto limited latitude to oppose 
Russia, given the latter’s leverage both in the Eurasian Customs Union’s multilateral 
framework and in its bilateral relations with Astana and Minsk. Yet while participation in 
the Customs Union may ultimately lead to some economic modernisation for Belarus 
(owing to the adoption of WTO-compliant standards), it results in increased tariffs and some 
                                                     
10 V. Putin (2011) «Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается 
сегодня », [‘New integration project for Eurasia – A future born today’], 3 October 
(http://izvestia.ru/news/502761). 
11 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk (2012), “The Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, 
Stagnation or Rivalry?”, Chatham House Briefing Paper. 
12 S. Blockmans, H. Kostanyan and E. Vorobiov (2012), “Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The 
challenge of integration and unity”, CEPS Special Report No. 75, Brussels, December.  
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evidence of trade diversion13 for Kazakhstan. Both Minsk and Astana are also reluctant to 
lose their political autonomy and opposed the inclusion of political clauses in the Treaty of 
the Eurasian Economic Union, scheduled to kick off on 1 January 2015.  
Moreover, the quest to expand the membership of the Eurasian Customs Union has also 
been driven by Russia’s power vis-à-vis prospective members. This is particularly the case in 
Central Asia. In principle, Russia is in a good position to induce Bishkek and Dushanbe to 
join the Customs Union. It can rely upon powerful leverages, inter alia the remittances of 
Tajik and Kyrgyz migrant workers from Russia, which in 2012 amounted to 19.6% and 45% 
of their GDP respectively. Yet  in December last year Kyrgyzstan made it clear that it would 
not join the Customs Union based upon a roadmap that was “prepared without its 
involvement”14 , thus implying that the document was imposed by Moscow. Kyrgyzstan 
requested a new roadmap, taking into account the country’s interests. Nowhere has Russia 
used more coercion than in its common neighbourhood. In the run-up to the Vilnius 
summit, tangible progress toward EU integration (with negotiations for Association 
Agreements and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements being finalised with 
Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, signature expected with Ukraine) prompted Russia to 
destabilise these countries with a view to actively undermining the Eastern Partnership.  
Generating instability in the common neighbourhood 
Armenia, whose president signed an agreement to join the Eurasian Economic Union on 10 
October 2014, has drastically altered its foreign policy under Russian pressure. The country 
successfully negotiated an Association Agreement including the DCFTA with the EU, which 
was supposed to act as a blueprint for modernisation. However, Russia’s leverage (based on 
a combination of its role as security ‘guarantor’ for Armenia and as an insecurity-provider 
through massive arms deliveries to Azerbaijan, the threat of increased energy prices and 
political pressures on the Armenian president) was instrumental in the country’s decision to 
join the Eurasian Customs Union instead. Armenia will now have to increase its external 
tariff from an average 2.9 % to 7.02 % after its entry into the Eurasian Economic Union; it 
will also have to reconsider its WTO commitments. The Armenian government asked for 
almost 900 exemptions from external tariffs. This high number reflects Armenian concerns 
about the economic consequences of Eurasian Union accession. Moreover, if the exemptions 
are not granted, Armenian membership to the Russia-led Custom Union will greatly add to 
its economic difficulties.  
In the run-up to, and in the wake of, the Vilnius summit Russia has also used pressure to 
undermine further progress of EU integration in Georgia, such as through threatening to 
suspend the 1994 free trade agreement and through ‘borderisation’, namely the construction 
of barricades along the administrative border with South Ossetia and the gradual expansion 
of the territory by moving the fences. For Moldova the pressure amounts to introducing an 
embargo on Moldovan wine in September 2013, and on fruit and vegetables in July 2014; 
supporting the organisation of a referendum on EU integration and Eurasian Customs 
Union in the autonomous region of Gagauzia in February 2014; instrumentalising the 
Transnistrian conflict and introducing amendments to migration law that may result in the 
return of the Moldovan migrants working in Russia.  
                                                     
13 I. Dreyer and N. Popescu (2014), “The Eurasian Customs Union: the economics and the politics”, 
EUISS Brief No. 11. 
14  “Kyrgyz President Rejects Current Customs-Union Road Map”, RFERL, 08 October 2014 
(http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan-rejects-customs-union-map/25202148.html). 
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But it is in Ukraine that Russia has pushed the destabilisation process to its limits. As early 
as in August 2013 Moscow started deploying instruments (custom checks, trade blockades) 
to push Ukraine towards joining the Eurasian Customs Union and to counter what it 
perceived as Ukraine’s irreversible move towards the EU through the signature of the 
Association Agreement. Yet with the ousting of President Yanukovych and the appointment 
of an interim government perceived to be hostile, Russia changed tactics and shifted 
towards undermining the country’s integrity and sovereignty − first by annexing Crimea 
and second by providing military support to separatists in south-eastern regions. 
Clearly, destabilisation has borne fruit in the short term. Russia has been able to counter the 
EU integration process in Armenia; it acts as a spoiler in Georgia and especially in Moldova 
and it has deeply undermined Ukraine’s stability and sovereignty. As a result the common 
neighbourhood now looks deeply divided between EU and Russian regional initiatives. In 
response to the signature of Association Agreements with the EU, Russia has retaliated by 
banning Moldovan meat and Ukrainian dairy products. Yet the methods currently used by 
Moscow are ultimately likely to damage Russia’s main instrument to (re)gain control in the 
long term, i.e. the Eurasian integration process. By using coercion Russia also alienates those 
partner countries (e.g. Georgia and Moldova) that have so far been able to resist its pressure 
to further engage in the European integration process. By resorting to punitive measures like 
embargos and deporting migrants, Russia also endangers the existing ties with post-Soviet 
countries, which are forced to look for new markets elsewhere.15 And by cutting off gas 
supplies to Ukraine, it prompts the country to diversify energy sources (e.g. by studying the 
feasibility of reverse flows from the EU) and to engage further in energy savings.  
Moscow’s involvement in the war in Ukraine and the manipulation of the crisis allowed the 
Kremlin to force Kyiv to divert resources away from the implementation of reforms agreed 
with the EU. Meanwhile, the ceasefire remains fragile and is under daily threat of collapse. 
More importantly, through the ‘Minsk Memorandum’ the Kremlin even managed to push 
Kyiv and Brussels into an agreement to delay the implementation (in part) of the DCFTA. 
Having obtained this concession, Moscow insisted that any future reform in Ukraine in line 
with the DCFTA would be considered as a violation of the Minsk Memorandum. The 
Kremlin was successful in annexing Crimea and stirring up conflict in parts of Donbas. 
However, the upcoming elections in Ukraine are likely to result in an anti-Russian 
parliament and Russia’s relationship with Ukraine has been severely damaged. In sum, by 
fomenting instability in Ukraine and the rest of the neighbourhood in the short term, Russia 
may act against its own interests in the long term. Victory in several small battles may well 
result in the loss of the war. 
A two dimensional strategy for the EU in its Eastern Neighbourhood 
The EU should respond to Russia’s role as a spoiler through becoming both more self-
critical; more ‘reflexive’ vis-à-vis its own policies and more responsive vis-à-vis Russia’s 
initiatives.  
                                                     
15 D. Cenusa, M. Emerson, T. Kovziridse and V. Movchan (2014), “Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy 
Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia”, CEPS Working Document No. 400, Brussels. 
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A more flexible EU  
A key parameter for the effectiveness of the ENP/EaP is for the EU to critically analyse both 
the effects of its policies on partner countries and the way in which they interact with 
existing regional ties.  
The Eastern Partnership initiative comes laden with a massive legal approximation with EU 
acquis under the AAs/DCFTAs, requiring the adoption of more than 300 EU directives and 
regulations, including most of the EU trade-related acquis communautaire.16 However, the 
requirements put forward by the EU carry broader economic and societal implications for 
the countries where the level of development is significantly lower. For instance, while likely 
to result in increased food security and modernisation for the agricultural sector over the 
long term, EU demands in terms of food safety standards also imply a complete 
transformation of partner countries’ approach to food safety in a very short time span.17 
Clearly, both the focus on regulatory approximation and the substance of EU requirements 
are not well suited to partner countries’ current development needs. The acquis was 
designed by EU member states for their own needs, i.e. for economies with a different level 
of development. Therefore, its effectiveness beyond the enlargement context - i.e. as a 
foreign policy tool - may be questioned if it is used without flexibility towards partner 
countries.  Moreover, the EU’s financial support and technical assistance are not likely to 
offer sufficient compensation for the short-term losses. The amount of EU aid per capita 
(ENPI commitments, 2007-13) ranges from between approximately €3 for Ukraine and €19 
for Moldova annually; 18  and the main recipients have been partner countries’ 
administrations, while the private sector (which has to implement most of DCFTA 
obligations) has been overlooked.19 This mismatch actually weakens the EU’s offer and only 
makes it more vulnerable to domestic shifts or regional pressure. Domestically the short-
term costs to be incurred as part of the reforms might create socio-economic problems for 
the current political elites among the Eastern neighbours, which in turn will make them 
more vulnerable to Russian pressure. The EU’s lack of sensitivity to domestic needs and 
contexts only makes it more difficult for partner countries in a complex regional 
environment. The EU has recently understood this, as demonstrated by the decisions to lift 
its quotas on Moldovan wines in response to the Russian embargo, as well as all restrictions 
on the accession of Ukrainian goods to EU markets. 
Flexibility thus starts with the national context in which EU policies are embedded. Instead 
of imposing a one-size-fits-all conditionality that does not take into account partners’ 
specificities, the EU should aim at a profound diversification of its relations with all the 
countries in its neighbourhood. Arguably, the Eastern Partnership now includes a degree of 
differentiation, with three countries having signed AAs and DCFTAs while the three 
remaining countries have not. Yet this differentiation is still too rough and there are major 
differences within each group. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are at very different stages of 
economic and political reform and they face different problems. However, the AAs and the 
DCFTAs signed with them are largely similar and do not take into account the specificities 
of the partners. This calls for increased EU attention and adjustment during the 
                                                     
16 M. Emerson (2014), “Trade policy issues in the wider Europe – that led to war and not yet peace”, 
CEPS Working Document No. 398, Brussels. 
17 EU-Moldova Association Agreement, Title 5, Chapter 4. 
18 L. Delcour (2012), “Improving EU Aid to its Neighbours”, briefing for the European Parliament 
AFET Committee. 
19 L. Delcour and K. Wolczuk (2013), “Beyond the Vilnius Summit”, op. cit. 
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implementation phase. Even more striking are differences between Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Belarus. Yet they are now lumped together in the group of unwilling Eastern partners, while 
the factors behind their reluctance differ substantially. Tailored proposals and tangible offers 
are needed for those Eastern Partnership countries that are unwilling and/or unable to 
embark on the path of comprehensive association with the EU. The EU will enhance the 
effectiveness of its policies by taking into account the specific context in which they are 
embedded.  
A more responsive EU 
Ultimately, what the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership offer is a 
long-term development model. Nonetheless, the EU is likely to be influential in its 
neighbourhood in the long term only if it is able to constantly adjust to its environment and 
address short-term challenges in a timely manner. Current developments in the Eastern 
neighbourhood, either domestically or as a result of Russia’s policies, require an immediate 
response. However, too often the EU sticks to its long-term approach without being able to 
adjust its policies when developments in the field require either prompt or firm reactions.  
Ukraine is a case in point. Under the Yanukovych presidency, even though it became 
increasingly harsh, the EU only belatedly resorted to conditionality in response to the 
growing authoritarian trends. It was also at a very late stage (second half of February 2014) 
that it decided to introduce sanctions against the former Ukrainian authorities, while the 
police had been making an excessive use of force since the Euromaidan started at the end of 
November 2013. This weakened both the EU’s leverage over the country’s authorities and its 
credibility among protesters. 
Presently, the EU’s long-term policies towards the neighbourhood and the EU’s short-term 
crisis management and common security and defence policy (CSDP) remain separate and in 
need of better integration.20  Clearly, the specific features of EU foreign policy (e.g. its 
multilateral character) make it more difficult to respond quickly to unanticipated events. 
Nevertheless, under the ENP, and especially the Eastern Partnership, the EU has both 
intensified the level of dialogue with Eastern partner governments and introduced new 
formats of cooperation and dialogue with a wide range of non-governmental actors in 
partner countries. Without doubt, the EU is now in a better position to monitor 
developments closely in the field. However, it needs to incorporate the outcomes of such 
monitoring more effectively and promptly in its policy approach.  
Conclusions 
Following the recent crisis in the EU-Russia common neighbourhood, the picture that 
emerges is one of confrontation, leading to a parting of the ways between the EU and Russia. 
Firstly, today’s Russia and the EU have little in common, while ten years ago their 
partnership was launched on the premise that the EU’s and Russia’s “common values and 
shared interests” would develop along the same lines. Secondly, both Russia and the EU are 
increasingly turning to other partners. As a consequence the EU-Russian strategic 
partnership is bereft of substance, which is likely to remain unchanged for years to come. 
While the estrangement between the EU and Russia  is apparent, an outright split would be 
much more problematic because of the close interdependence of the two partners. 
                                                     
20 S. Blockmans (2014), “Priorities for the Next Legislature: EU external action”, CEPS Commentary, 
Brussels, September. 
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Divisions between the EU and Russia have been mirrored by deepening fault lines in their 
common neighbourhood. Three Eastern Partnership countries signed the Association 
Agreements including DCFTAs (Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia); others are part of (Belarus) 
or are planning to join (Armenia) the Eurasian integration project, and a partner 
(Azerbaijan) shows no interest in either of the integration formats. While this suggests a 
clear-cut division between those countries favouring deep economic integration with the EU 
and those remaining inside the Russian hub, the picture in the region is actually much more 
complex. As a result of Russia’s attempts to undermine progress towards further integration 
with the EU and NATO, in some cases dividing lines pass through partner countries such as 
Georgia (with South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Moldova (with Transnistria) and Ukraine (with 
Crimea). Moreover, the lines dividing the neighbourhood are by no means immutable. They 
are likely to fluctuate as a result of the simultaneous deployment of two competing offers 
which, to a large extent, are still in the making. Thus, new lines may appear in the future, 
such as through Gagauzia and eastern/southern Ukraine. In addition, the continuity and 
solidity of partner countries’ commitments in either the Eurasian integration or the EU 
integration process is yet to be ascertained, given the highly volatile domestic and regional 
environment. There are serious questions about the ability and/or willingness of Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia to implement the commitments they have undertaken through 
signing the Association Agreements and the DCFTAs with the EU. The reluctant 
participation of Armenia in the Eurasian project, and Belarus’ and Kazakhstan’s opposition 
to including political aspects in the Eurasian integration are not to be underestimated either.  
The EU and Russia will remain key powers in all the countries of the increasingly 
fragmented neighbourhood, yet the extent of their influence and the way in which they exert 
it will vary considerably across countries. On the one hand, the Kremlin’s perception of the 
AAs and the DCFTAs as tools preparing the ground for the countries of the post-Soviet 
space to join the EU and NATO is likely to continue to drive its policies in the region. On the 
other hand, in the EU’s view the countries included in the Eastern Partnership are sovereign 
states that are entitled to negotiate and sign agreements with any international actor without 
the intervention of third countries. For Russia, however, these are merely abstract concepts 
and it has shown a great willingness to counter what it sees as the ‘Westernisation’ of its 
neighbours.  
In the current volatile climate, the EU needs a strategy towards Russia that goes beyond 
sanctions. In reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, 
the EU’s incoming leadership should be more sensitive towards the existing political, 
diplomatic, economic, energy and military ties between Russia and the countries in the 
common neighbourhood. After all, it is by exploiting these ties that Russia was able to turn 
the common neighbourhood into an area of destructive competition − the primary victim of 
which is Ukraine. Understanding Russia’s perceptions and being sensitive to these 
longstanding ties does not mean justifying their use by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, factoring 
these ties into the EU’s policies vis-à-vis its Eastern neighbourhood is a prerequisite for more 
reflective, responsive and effective EU policies. 
